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From Buffalo to Beeves: The Transformation of the Oglala Lakota Economy, 1868-1889 
(63 pgs)
The twenty-year period between 1868 and 1889 marked a significant and liminal period 
for the Oglala Lakota culture. The nomadic equestrian society that depended upon the 
buffalo as their most significant economic resource, itself only a little over a century old, 
ended dramatically with the extermination of the bison and the implementation of the 
United States’ reservation policy. This thesis examines the economic changes that 
occurred within that twenty-year period, and how the Oglala Lakota attempted to adapt 
themselves to the alien incursions of the white men and their strange ideas and way of 
life. The study centers on the emergent cattle industry that developed in the region 
surrounding the Red Cloud Agency and then later the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation.
The Oglala, defeated by and dependent on the United States, sought to establish a new 
economy based upon the burgeoning cattle industry that emerged in that region following 
the Civil War. However, the tribe faced significant obstacles, including an unyielding 
federal bureaucracy with its unrealistic policies, and regional competition from whites 
surrounding the reservation and “squaw men” residing on the reservation. Moreover, the 
Oglala dealt with the pall of racism in their struggle to enter the economic fray of the 
cattle industry on the Northern Great Plains.
For the Oglala cattle came to represent not only a foundation for a new tribal economy, 
but a link to more traditional social and economic practices within Lakota society. The 
Oglala attempted to incorporate new economic and social realities within their pre­
existing culture infrastructure in order to deal with these changes in a more familiar 
setting. Unfortunately, such attempts failed as federal policies pertaining to the 
assimilation of Native American cultures, which were influenced by philanthropic 
Jeffersonian ideals, provided strict guidelines for social, political, and economic behavior.
My work is heavily influenced by studies by Richard White, Gary Anderson, David 
Rich Lewis, and Peter Iverson. These historians examined the cultural changes that occur 
when two or more different cultures come together in an attempt to understand one 
another. I have chosen the period from 1868 to 1889 because this liminal, yet relatively 
brief, period of time saw the Oglala Lakota descend from rulers of the Northern Great 
Plains to a dependent nation completely at the mercy of the United States. The thesis is 
divided into three chapters, each of which focuses on one economic stage of development 
during this period. The first explores the end of the buffalo economy and the introduction 
of cattle to the tribal economy . The second looks at early Oglala attempts to enter the 
regional cattle industry. The final chapter examines the events and circumstances that 
frustrated the tribe’s inchoate cattle economy.
Director: Dan Flores
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INTRODUCTION
When Europeans arrived in the Americas they found not only a “new world,” they 
encountered an extremely diverse indigenous population. These Native Americans 
developed a wide range of cultures in the thousands of years of migration and occupation 
of North, Central, and South America. Advanced civilizations, such as the Aztec and Inca 
in South America, coexisted with much more primitive societies on their respective 
continents.1 Despite cultural differences many Native American societies developed 
mutually beneficial trade systems that flourished long before contact with Europeans. For 
example, the sedentary Pueblo Indians participated in an exchange with nomadic plains 
tribes in what is now the Southwestern United States and Northern Mexico from 
approximately 1450 AD until the 1600s. The Pueblo villages exchanged com, bread, 
cotton blankets, and ceramics for bison meat, fat, and hides with tribes such as the Apache 
and Comanche. This mutualistic economic system ended when the Spanish gained military 
control over the Pueblo villages. More significantly, a pattern of economic disruption 
within Native communities held true throughout the conquest of the Americas.2
Euro-Americans forever altered, and sometimes destroyed, indigenous economies, 
despite the fact that they were more than willing to accommodate themselves to such trade 
networks when it facilitated the completion of their missions, whether economically or 
politically motivated. This does not, however, necessarily imply a conscious or malevolent
1 For a classic narrative on the conquest of the Incas see John Hemming, The Conquest o f  the Incas (New  
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970); and for an ethnohistocial examination of the Aztec conquest see 
Ross Hassig, M exico and the Spanish Conquest (London: Longman Group UK Limited, 1994).
" Katherine A. Spielmann, “Late Prehistoric Exchange Between the Southwest and Southern Plains,” Plains 
Anthropologis, (November 1983, vol. 28), 257-272.
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intent upon the part of Europeans to systematically bring an end to Native American 
economies. The destruction of indigenous economies resulted when Euro-Americans 
gained dominance over Native American cultures politically, economically, socially, or 
through any combination of the three. When a cultural imbalance occurred the dominant 
society forced the more vulnerable culture into adopting their economic patterns and 
techniques. While this does not mean that the dominant culture was not affected, and did 
not change, it does mean that the cultural response for the weaker society occurred with 
more significant social alterations within that society. Consequently, when different 
cultures meet, the result of the negotiated response to circumstances is adaptation, which 
is an attempt to maintain preexisting conditions in the face of change.3 This study 
examines the Oglala Lakota’s attempt to economically “adapt” to their defeat and 
subsequent submission to the United States’ federal government.
For the Oglala tribe, the threat from the United States appeared swiftly and 
brought about significant cultural alterations. In the brief twenty-year period between 
1868 and 1889, the tribe went from the dominant regional power on the Northern Plains 
to the utterly defeated foe of the United States’ military. More importantly, it was during 
this period that the culture of the Oglala tribe fell victim to the ideological impingements 
of Enlightenment thought and economic capitalism that personified western civilization 
during this period. The United States government’s policy concerning Native Americans 
centered on the incorporation of indigenous peoples into American mainstream society,
3 For an extensive and fascinating anthropological examination o f this topic see, Roy Ellen, Environment, 
subsistence and system: The ecology o f  small-scale social form ations  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982), 24 \ .
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and that meant Native Americans needed to adopt capitalism as the economic base of their 
society. Despite conservative attempts to maintain and reproduce the Oglala tribe’s 
economic infrastructure, the tribe failed to preserve their traditional modes of production 
and social structure during this liminal period.4
Other studies pertaining to the interactions of Euro-Americans and Native 
Americans bolster the argument laid out in this thesis. Richard White’s seminal work, 
Roots o f Dependency, illuminated the negative influence that the market economy played 
in the destruction of Native American cultures. However, White overemphasized the 
inevitability of tribal economic dependence on the ever-expanding capitalistic system. 
Moreover, his study portrayed Native Americans as nearly helpless victims of the 
malevolent virus of capitalism. According to White, the market itself made Indians 
dependent and dispossessed.5
White’s next study, The Middle Ground, presented a different picture entirely. 
Instead of inevitable dependence White found extended periods of accommodation 
between Euro-Americans and the indigenous tribes in the Great Lakes region. He noted 
that for as long as both cultures remained relatively balanced in terms of power, what 
arose was a world where the two cultures, white and Indian, created a new system of 
meaning and cultural exchange for each society. White also stated that cultural 
accommodation broke down when the Americans extended their hegemony over the
4 According to a theory presented by Thomas D. Hall in, Social Change in the Southwest, 1350-1880  
(Lawrence: University Press o f Kansas, 1989), 22-23, by 1889 the Oglala belonged in what he called the third 
level o f social structural incorporation. This means that one culture is dependent upon another and has lost its 
ability to regain its culture, as it existed before contact with the dominant society.
5 Richard White, The Roots o f  Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change am ong the 
Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983.
3
region following the War of 1812. In economic terms White’s study still focuses on trade 
dependency as a cause of the tribe’s downfall.6 For the Oglala Lakota, dependency upon 
American trade goods played very little role in the tribe’s economic transformation during 
the period in question.
Kathryn E. Holland Braund’s Deerskins and Duffels, examines the Creek tribe’s 
relationship with Euro-Americans, and mirrors White’s later work in many respects. She 
finds an extended period of cultural accommodation between the Creek tribe and Spanish, 
English, and then later, American settlers. Furthermore, as with White, she also marks the 
Creeks’ cultural downfall at 1815, when the United States gained complete control o f the 
deerskin trade within the region. However, she goes farther than White by giving credit to 
the Creek tribe for the economic success, and even survival, of Euro-American colonies in 
the Southeastern region of the United States.7 Both White and Braund focused on the 
economic influence of Euro-American society and the changes that occurred within Native 
American society as a result.
Ethnohistorian David Rich Lewis’s text, Neither Wolf Nor Dog, parallels my study 
on the Oglala Lakota more closely than either White’s or Braund’s. The focus of Lewis’s 
study centers on Native American adaptation to the implementation of federal programs 
designed to promote Native American assimilation into mainstream American society. 
Lewis examines three western tribes; the Northern Utes, Hupas, and Tohono O’odhams 
and their experiences with the United States government’s agrarian civilization programs.
5 Richard White, The M iddle Ground: Indians, empires, and republics in the G reat Lakes region, 1650-1815
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
' Kathryn E. Holland Braund, Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685- 
1815  (Lincoln: University o f  Nebraska Press, 1993).
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He found that each group, when faced with assimilation into white society, attempted to 
adapt to changes in a manner consistent with their traditional, or pre-contact, modes of 
production. Lewis ultimately found that each tribe “found itself marginally incorporated 
or abandoned on the periphery of American society, a product of impractical theory and 
expectation.”8 Tribes, when faced with change, will either consciously or unconsciously 
try to replicate their cultural system by applying familiar social structures to these changes 
in order to make them less threatening and more acceptable. Lewis presents a pattern of 
change within indigenous cultures that compares quite closely to the economic crisis 
experienced by the Oglala Lakota.
Peter Iverson’s study, When Indians Became Cowboys, examines the cultural 
significance of the relationship between cattle and Indians. Iverson believes that cattle 
ranching meant more than just an economic enterprise for Native Americans. For Native 
Americans, such as the Lakota, Apache, and others, ranching offered tribes an avenue 
toward maintaining their tribal identity. Iverson goes so far as to state that “cattle 
ranching emerged, therefore, as a symbol of a new day.”9 However, while it is true that to 
this day many Native American tribes maintain their tribal identities, in the process of 
cultural adaptation they lost their tribal cultures. Furthermore, the struggle to successfully 
maintain their tribal identities contained many variables in the equation, including a racist 
white society more than willing to relegate Indians to the periphery of American society. 
The “new day” for many tribes meant poverty and cultural extinction.
8 David Rich Lewis, Neither W olf Nor D og: American Indians, Environment, and Agrarian Change (New  
York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 4.
9 Peter Iverson, When Indians Became Cowboys: Native Peoples and Cattle Ranching in the American West 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), 14.
Studies pertaining specifically to the Oglala Lakota include the works of Catherine 
Price, The Oglala People, 1841-1879, and Robert Utley, The Last Days o f the Sioux 
Nation.10 Price examines the political developments, mainly warfare, of the tribe from 
1841 to 1879. She found that, despite the United States government’s attempts to modify 
the political customs of the Oglala tribe and undermine the influence of its leaders, the 
tribe’s adaptable and fluid political organization allowed the tribe to cope with the 
hegemonic menace presented by the United States. Price, because of her focus on 
political events, logically states that the end of Oglala culture occurred in 1879, the last 
year the tribe presented any real military threat to the United States.
Historian Robert Utley, however, marked 1890 as the “last days of the Sioux 
nation.” The Battle of Wounded Knee in 1890 provided two reasons for this date to 
signify the end of the Sioux nation. First, it was the tribe’s last military defeat. Secondly, 
and more importantly, Utley believes that the disintegration of the Ghost Dance religion 
provided the United States with a psychological victory over the tribe. The Oglala no 
longer believed that they could return to their old ways once Wovoka’s predictions of the 
great millennium proved false. However, the dates noted as the end of the “Sioux nation” 
are arbitrary. No such definite date exists because the process of cultural breakdown 
occurred over a period of many years.
This study focuses on the years between 1868 and 1889 because, as noted above, 
it was this period that witnessed the end of Oglala hegemony on the Northern Plains. The
lu Catherine Price. The O glala People, 1841-1879: A Political H istory  (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska 
Press, 1996); and Robert M. Utley, The Last D ays o f  the Sioux Nation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1963).
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date 1889 is significant only because it marked an end to the tribe’s opportunity of self- 
sufficiency within the American economic system. After this date the Oglala found it 
impossible to successfully compete in a regional economy dominated by white ranchers, 
which prevented the Oglala from providing for their own needs within the encroaching 
American market economy. More significantly, the date 1889 was a turning point in 
Oglala culture because the social structures that defined the Oglala culture finally 
succumbed to the onslaught of the misplaced philanthropic policy of the United States 
government.
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CHAPTER ONE 
The End of the Buffalos’ Reign: The Introduction of Cattle to the Oglala Economy
On a cold winter day in December of 1871 the herd came under attack. Some of 
the beasts ran wildly across the Dakota prairie in a mad attempt to escape the Oglala 
hunters, while others milled about in confusion.11 The bellows of the wounded and 
frightened animals mixed with the shouts of the mounted hunters to create a symphony of 
primordial discord that mingled with the cloudy breath of the men, horses, and beasts, and 
rose into the brisk winter air. Upon this contentious theater of the Northern Plains the 
great ungulates fell, brought down one after the other by the determined hunters, pierced 
by arrow or bullet, until the entire herd lay still. Once the men finished their violent task 
the women came to skin and butcher the animals. The hides were stripped from the 
beasts’ flesh and much of the offal, such as livers and kidneys, devoured on the spot.
When the Indians had eaten their fill, they prepared and then stored the remainder for the 
coming winter months. This scene undoubtedly played itself out countless times in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the Oglala Lakota developed into one of the most 
successful nomadic hunting groups on the Northern Plains. What sets this event apart 
from previous hunts is the fact that the prey animals were not buffalo, or Bison bison, so 
closely associated with Plains tribes in American history and folklore. They were 
government issued steers.12
n Office o f Indian Affairs to U. S. Indian Agent J. W. Daniels, Dec. 16, 1871, General Records, Box 2, RG 75, 
KC. The letter instructs Daniels to employ and supervise the Indians in the slaughter o f government cattle for 
the purpose of packing the meat for future use. The cold weather was believed to enhance the effort by 
preventing the meat from becoming spoiled.
'~The Statutes at Large, Treaties and Proclamations, o f  the United States o f  America, from  D ecem ber 1867, 
to M arch 1869, Edited by George P. Sanger, Counselor at Law, Vol. XV, (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1869), 639. It was stated in the Treaty of Fort Laramie, Article X, concluded on April 2 9 ,1 8 6 8  
that, “each Indian over the age of four years, who shall have removed to and settled permanently upon said 
reservation and complied with the stipulations o f this treaty, shall be entitled to receive from the United States, 
for the period o f four years after he shall have settled upon the reservation, one pound o f meat.. .provided the 
Indians cannot furnish their own subsistence at an earlier date.”
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The fact that the federal government turned loose hundreds of steers for the Oglala 
to hunt in a familiar, or “traditional,” manner represents more than a fascinating example 
of the United States-Indian relationship. It demonstrated the beginning of economic 
change that forever altered Oglala tribal culture. This paper will examine the pivotal role 
cattle and the cattle industry played in the formation of a new Oglala economy from the 
signing of the Treaty of Fort Laramie in 1868 to the Sioux Act of 1889. For although the 
Oglala knew of cattle and oxen before this period, predominantly from settlers who 
crossed Lakota territory heading west, bovines were never more than a target of 
opportunity in raiding or hunting to supplement a diet based almost completely on buffalo 
meat. However, as buffalo began to disappear from the Northern Plains, the federal 
government, through a series of treaties, accepted responsibility for providing the Lakota 
with an adequate food supply. After this development the relationship between the Oglala 
and cattle evolved into something quite new. Cattle progressed from a target of 
convenience to a replacement for the quickly diminishing buffalo herds. However, the 
steers and cows supplied to the tribe meant more than replacement protein. For the 
Lakota, cattle represented both an opportunity to continue their equestrian and nomadic 
way of life as a self-sufficient and independent people, and a vehicle that revolutionized 
not only their economy, but the entire structure of their society.
The hunt referred to at the top of this paper demonstrated one method used by the 
Oglala to hold on to their traditional methods of meat procurement, which entailed the 
active pursuit and killing of the prey animal from horseback. However, by the early 1890s 
the federal government successfully ended that particular manner of slaughtering and 
butchering of the Oglala tribes’ issued beef. Other Oglala techniques used for the care and 
distribution of stock since 1868, such as communal herds run by an extended family unit, 
also ended because of governmental intervention. Instead, the American method of stock
9
raising, itself derived from a collage of European ranching traditions, replaced the Oglala 
tribe’s communal method by the turn of the century.13 This change occurred because 
western white society did not tolerate deviation from cultural norms, especially from those 
believed to be culturally inferior. It was during this critical twenty-one year period that 
the Oglala struggled with both the loss of their independence and power and with the 
necessity of developing a new tribal economy to replace their buffalo centered culture that 
so quickly disappeared. However, this complex process did not take place in a regional 
vacuum, for the attitudes and ideologies brought by the white invaders played a crucial 
role in the evolution of a new Oglala economy.
These European beliefs and feelings that so greatly influence the Oglala coalesced 
from decades, if not centuries, of European contact with other indigenous tribes scattered 
across both of the Americas. By the turn of the nineteenth century many American 
intellectuals believed that Native Americans needed to be absorbed into white society, and 
that ultimately through miscegenation they would eventually become white men and 
women.14 This process entailed the transformation of barbarous heathens into sedentary 
Christians. It mattered little to American policy makers what type of culture these various 
tribes might enjoy. Their existence depended on accepting incorporation into white 
society. The ideas and actions of American leaders who delineated federal Indian policy 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries evolved from a growing intellectual 
movement in Europe.
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries European civilization 
functioned under the influences of the Enlightenment. Belief in the attributes of science
13For an in-depth study of Western cattle ranching’s origins see the seminal work o f  Terry G. Jordan, North 
American Cattle Ranching Frontiers: Origins, Diffusion, and Differentiations (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 1993).
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superseded those of religious dogma in the minds of most European leaders. In the eyes 
of most occidental societies nineteenth century western civilization represented the 
culmination of thousands of years of human development. Mankind had created a society 
that would inevitably reach perfection. This firm belief in the greatness of western white 
society meant that any culture that differed from theirs was inherently flawed. It also 
meant that these leaders of western civilization possessed a moral obligation not only to 
themselves but to their descendants to insure the Indians’ survival and inclusion into 
western culture. And since Native American societies appeared hopelessly inferior they by 
default had to be repaired or exterminated. But how would one go about repairing, or 
elevating, these unfortunate people? By reshaping them into a model of one’s own 
culture, a culture grounded on an emerging market economy.
In order to complete this seemingly benevolent and necessary task the intellectual 
philanthropists needed to gain the support of the newly formed government of the United 
States of America. This task was made easier by the fact that most American intellectuals 
gained some form of political power following the American Revolution. Thomas 
Jefferson for example, was a great proponent of the transformation of native peoples into 
productive American citizens. Because of the beliefs of Jefferson and his contemporaries 
the federal government sought to create a system that would allow Indians to evolve so 
that they might one day join in mankind’s march to perfection. Later in the nineteenth 
century well-intentioned “reformers” such as Richard Henry Pratt, who founded the 
Carlisle Boarding School for Indians in 1875, attempted to complete the transformation of 
Native Americans into American citizens. Pratt and his fellow reformers believed “that 
there was only one way for the Indians to survive the onslaught of progress: they would
14 Bernard Sheehan, Seeds o f  Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian (New York:
W. W. Norton & Company, 1974). See Part Two. Program for a discussion of this ideology and belief system.
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have to be swallowed up in the rushing tide of American life and institutions.”13 In other 
words Native Americans might survive, but only by forsaking their own culture for 
another.
For most of the nineteenth century the one word that characterized the policy and 
goal of the federal government towards Native Americans was assimilation. The 
American government pursued a policy that attempted to transform Native American 
cultures into a mirror image of American society. This image centered on the yeoman 
farmer. Native Americans were encouraged not only to pursue farming as a vocation but 
to do so using accepted European or American methods of horticulture. This meant that 
tribes such as the Iroquois of the north, and the Creek of the south, who already practiced 
extensive agricultural pursuits, needed to adopt new methods of farming. However, this 
seemingly innocuous reorganization of the physical labor needed to harvest an adequate 
crop entailed dramatic cultural adjustments for Native Americans.
Tribes such as the Creek, Cherokee, and others maintained matrilineal social 
systems. This cultural characteristic gave women control over both the land and crops, 
which they controlled and tended respectively. This allowed tribal women far greater 
political and economic influence than their Anglo counterparts. For example, women of 
the Iroquois tribe made decisions about when and where to plant and harvest their crops, 
which effectively gave control of the tribe’s economy to them. They also maintained the 
ability to call their men to war in order to revenge an attack from a neighboring tribe, 
options unavailable to white women. Men on the other hand were expected to provide 
protection and meat for the tribe, and maintain diplomatic relations with both surrounding 
tribes and then whites, occupations that often found them away from home for extended
15 David Wallace Adams, Education fo r  Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience 
1875-1928  (Lawrence: University o f Kansas Press, 1995), 39.
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periods. White perceptions of Iroquois culture, heavily influenced by Euro-centrism, were 
of lazy men who lay about the village while the women slaved away in the fields. White 
men found this situation offensive, and set about correcting these “flaws” in Native 
American culture. Unfortunately, the malignant stain of racism would prevent Native 
American assimilation in the manner proposed by such philanthropists as Thomas 
Jefferson. The pall of racism, coupled with both political and economic difficulties often 
present when two vastly different cultures meet, would prevent the Iroquois, Cherokee, 
and eventually the Lakota from participating equally with whites in American society.16
Interestingly, the popular conception that European women did not work the fields 
along side their men has been refuted by studies from such noted historians as Laurel 
Thatcher Ulrich. She noted that the lives of frontier women in America were extremely 
arduous. Besides caring for the children and home, spinning cloth, churning butter and the 
hundreds of other difficult tasks associated with “women’s work” during that time, they 
also carried seed and plowed fields when necessary. The hypocrisy of this situation failed 
to influence European policy and the program of assimilation proceeded. However, 
assimilation of Native Americans into European society as yeomen farmers, or any other 
occupation, faced the insurmountable obstacle of racism.
That Native Americans suffered harsh treatment at the hands of whites is not an 
unfamiliar reality. One need look no further than “The Trail of Tears” that the five 
civilized tribes endured during the 1830s and 1840s to find an example of the white man’s 
inhumanity towards Indians. And the root cause of this horrific occurrence rests squarely 
on the universally held belief that Native Americans were lesser beings than whites, and
16 For details o f Iroquois society and the roles women played see the texts by Matthew Dennis, Cultivating a 
Landscape o f  Peace: Iroquois-European Encounters in Seventeenth-Century Am erica  (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1993), 27-31 ,65-74; and the classic work of Anthony F.C. Wallace. The Death an d  Rebirth  
o f  the Seneca (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), 21-48.
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that the rights of Native Americans meant little in comparison to the interests of whites. 
Tribes such as the Cherokee and Creek who to a large degree successfully reshaped their 
societies to mimic the plantation culture of the South, found themselves being driven out 
of their lands despite their attempts to acquiesce to federal assimilation policy.
While it is undoubtedly true that white Americans’ desire for more land greatly 
influenced the decision to relocate these tribes in Oklahoma Territory it is also true that 
these tribes’ legal claim to their lands were ignored in the interests of whites. It would be 
foolish to argue that racism played either no, or very little, role in the forced removal of 
these five tribes. Might the state of Georgia, and later Alabama, have driven white settlers 
from these lands in order to make room for more white settlers? Of course not, the 
Cherokee and Creek were forced off their lands because they were Indians, and their 
claims to the land paled in comparison to white needs. Unfortunately, the Lakota faced 
similar threats in the latter half of the nineteenth century. They too faced the loss of their 
land, forced assimilation, racism and a federal bureaucracy at odds with its own agents in 
the field. However, before examining these events it is necessary to explore who the 
Lakota were as a people in order to understand more clearly the economic challenges they 
faced by the late nineteenth century.
The Lakota society of nomadic horsemen and warriors that is so familiar to most 
Americans actually developed rather late in tribal history, emerging in the latter half of the 
eighteenth century when the tribe acquired horses. Before this period the Siouan society 
could be characterized as one of loosely organized nomadic hunter-gatherers. The Siouan 
tribe’s mobility and need for large hunting areas in which to acquire sufficient foodstuffs 
may have expedited the break-up of the seven original tribes: the Yanktons, Yanktonais, 
and Tetons that eventually moved west, and the Mdewakantons, Wahpetons, Wahpekutes,
14
and Sissetons that eventually remained near the headwaters of the upper Mississippi.17 
The Oglala, members of the Teton branch of the Siouan peoples, originally dwelt in the 
Ohio Valley until scattered both eastward and westward by the more organized and better­
armed Iroquois in the early seventeenth century.18 The Oglala then settled near the 
headwaters of the Mississippi River. They remained in this region until approximately 
1670 when “abundant beaver and the ready food supply provided by the buffalo herds 
lured them into the open lands.”19
The beginning of the eighteenth century saw a dramatic shift in Lakota society as 
the tribe migrated to the prairies and started hunting the vast herds of buffalo that 
occupied these grasslands. The Lakota’s hostile nature made them disagreeable 
neighbors, and tribes such as the Otoes, Poncas, and Omahas fled westward in the face of 
the Lakota advance. Unfortunately for these tribes, the Lakota followed, settling in the 
regions east of the Missouri River by the mid-eighteenth century. However, at this time 
the powerful Arikara nation halted the Lakota’s westward advance. These more sedentary 
peoples at first fled before the Lakota during the first half of the century; however, 
bolstered by the acquisition of horses and metal blades they were successfully able to 
withstand the encroachment of the ambitious Lakota. The Arikara remained an obstacle 
to westward expansion until a smallpox epidemic swept away approximately 80% of their 
population between 1772-1780. During this same period the Oglala Lakota first obtained 
horses and began their journey toward western legend. When the tribe crossed the 
Missouri River they numbered no more than twenty to forty lodges. Yet,
1 'Gary Clayton Anderson, Kinsmen o f  Another Kind: Dakota-White Relations in the Upper M ississippi 
Valley, 1650-1862  (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1984), 2.
lsHerbert S. Schell, H istory o f  South D akota  (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1968), 18.
19 Richard White, “The Winning o f the West: The Expansion o f the Western Sioux in the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries;’ The Journal o f  American H istory, (September 1978, vol. 65), 322.
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“once across the Missouri their small numbers did not deter them from pushing boldly out 
into the open plains where they quickly obtained horses and were soon roving widely, 
hunting buffalo, and fighting enemies on all sides.”20
From the period between 1750 and 1868 the Oglala people experienced dramatic 
changes within their society. In the mid-eighteenth century the tribe used dog and human 
power to traverse the open plains. With the acquisition and utilization of horses as beasts 
of burden the tribe dramatically increased its range. An Indian pony could carry eight 
times more than an Indian dog and travel three times farther in a single day.21 However, 
the most significant contribution made by the horse was as a hunting tool. Mounted 
hunters provided the tribe far greater accessibility to the vast herds of buffalo that roamed 
the plain’s oceans of grasslands. It was during this century and a half that buffalo became 
the center of Lakota culture and economy. Buffalo provided the tribes with food from the 
meat and organs, shelter and clothing from its hides, and much more. Without the vast 
herds of buffalo it is doubtful that the Lakota, or any other Great Plains tribe, such as the 
Blackfoot or Comanche, would have possessed such great numbers or power in their 
respective territories.
While it is not the focus of this paper it is significant to note that buffalo played a 
central role within Oglala religion, and the sudden loss of the great herds undoubtedly 
brought about significant societal angst. Interestingly, cattle were used by the Oglala to 
replace buffalo as a food source, yet cattle never joined the phalanx of animals present in 
Lakota religion. Both the rapidity of the Lakota’s loss of both the buffalo and their
20George E. Hyde, R ed  Cloud's Folk: A H istory o f  the O glala Sioux Indians (Norman: University o f  
Oklahoma Press, 1937), 21. This text offers an outstanding history o f  the Oglala, Lakota before 1877, their 
movements and inter and intra-tribal relations
21 H. Clyde Wilson, “An Inquiry into the Nature o f Plains Indian Cultural Development,” American  
Anthropologist, (1963, vol. 65), 355-369.
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independence, coupled with cattle’s association with whites, provided the tribe little 
opportunity or desire to find religious significance within cattle. Nonetheless, with the 
addition of the horse the tribe’s energy production and mobility increased dramatically, 
and the Oglala grew more numerous and powerful. Yet at the same time their political 
structure became more decentralized.
Unlike many neighboring sedentary agriculturists whose societies developed a 
strictly hierarchical organization, the Oglala formed a loose confederation of patriarchal 
led family units called tiospaye 22 The development of this loose confederation allowed 
the Lakota people greater flexibility and maneuverability for following the herds of 
buffalo, which in turn kept the tribe well fed. Kinship relationships and reciprocity within 
the tiospaye, and the tribe as a whole, came to control the economy. One gained respect 
and status within the community by providing food, clothing, and shelter for your family 
and others within your tribe, not by the accumulation of material possessions for mere 
individual gain. Thus, the economic process remained subservient to social structure and 
labor. For a period of approximately 100 years the Lakota developed and enjoyed this 
equestrian nomadic lifestyle that allowed them to tap more efficiently into the 
thermodynamic system of the Great Plains, specifically the harvesting of the vast herds of 
buffalo. However, this way of life disappeared with the buffalo and the emergence of 
reservation life.23
The Treaty of Fort Laramie, promulgated on April 29, 1868, established The Great 
Sioux Reservation that occupied the western half of the present state of South Dakota,
“  Tiospaye are “sometimes defined as flexible exogamous residential units organized around a core of 
bilaterally related kin.” See Paul M. Robertson, “The Power o f the Land: Identity, Ethnicity, and Class among 
the Oglala, Lakota,” (Ph.D. diss., Union Institute, 1995), 4. For a comparison between the nomadic and 
sedentary cultures on the Great Plains see, William Holder’s, The Hoe and the H orse on the Plains: A Study o f  
Cultural Developm ent among North American Indians (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970).
23For a more detailed examination o f  Lakota economic structure see Anderson, Kinsmen , 58-76.
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parts of Wyoming, Montana, and Nebraska, with the eastern boundary being the Missouri 
River. The tribe maintained hunting rights within the reservation boundaries and, “the 
right to hunt on any lands north of the Platte, and on the Republican Fork of the Smoky 
Hill River, so long as the buffalo may range thereon in such numbers as to justify the 
chase.”24 However, much of the northern buffalo herd had already been eliminated from 
the reservation and the federal government had taken steps to alleviate the problem. In 
1865 the United States government agreed to pay each individual Lakota, “at the rate of 
about fifteen dollars per head per annum in view of the fact that the buffalo and other 
game, by means of which these nomadic tribes subsist, are being driven from the country 
by the whites who traverse it.”25 Special United States Indian Agent J. P. Cooper further 
indicated the severity o f the dwindling bison herds on August 27, 1868 when he requested 
that all Indians north of the Platte River be sent immediately to Fort Randall for supplies. 
He noted that, “the great danger now is that the scarcity of buffalo in that region will 
compel the Indians to commit depredations in order to live.”26
Many factors influenced the rapid disintegration of the northern bison herd, the 
most critical being the increased hide trade brought about by the development of a 
chemical tanning process that dramatically increased the demand for buffalo hides.27 
Furthermore, the invention of the paddlewheel boat provided the necessary transportation 
for shipping the heavy buffalo hides to eastern markets. Other factors included natural
24 The Statutes a t Large, Treaties and Proclamations o f  the United States o f  America, from Dec. 1867, to 
March 1869, Edited by George P. Sanger, Counselor at Law, Vol. XV, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 
1869), 639.
25 Executive Documents, The House o f Representatives, Report o f  the Commissioner o f  Indian Affairs, 39th 
Cong., 2nd sess., 1866-1867, Serial No. 1284 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1867), 5.
26 Executive Documents, The House o f Representatives, R eport o f  the Commissioner o f  Indian A ffairs , 40th 
Cong., 3rd sess., 1868-1869, Serial No. 1366 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1869), 711.
27 William A. Dobak, “Killing the Canadian Buffalo, 1821 -1881,” Western H istorical Q uarterly 27 (Spring 
1996, No. 1), 33-52.
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mortality, Indian subsistence hunting and market hunting for robes, wolf predation, 
possible disease introduction from cattle, and a warmer drying climate trend.28 The shift 
to generally milder winters, brought about by the end of the Little Ice Age, meant 
increased hardships for many Northern Plains tribes who relied upon well-established 
hunting patterns. As winter came to the Great Plains the buffalo would often seek both 
forage and shelter from the winds and deep snows in familiar river valleys. This migratory 
pattern of the buffalo allowed the tribes to predict the movements o f the great herds 
accurately and easily procure a large winter supply of meat. However, as the climate 
changed and winters became less severe the buffalo no longer sought food and shelter in 
these river valleys.29 Furthermore, the encroachment of white settlers into traditional 
buffalo watering areas and the bison’s natural migratory habits caused widely scattered 
herds had that roamed over the Northern Plains to coalesce into much larger herds.30 The 
mobility of these larger herds increased as they consumed the forage in an area more 
rapidly than the previously scattered herds. Therefore, the developing situation of large 
mobile herds moving about the plains in unpredictable patterns created sporadic hunting 
success throughout the Great Plains. For the Oglala this meant economic disaster.
Factors worked increasingly against the tribe’s ability to procure the needed 
buffalo so critical to their society, both nutritionally and culturally, thus making the tribe 
more dependent upon the federal government for their means of survival. For example, 
further hunting limitations were placed upon the Oglala during this crucial period of
28 For a fascinating examination o f the Southern Plains herds see Dan Flores’s, “Bison Ecology and Bison 
Diplomacy: The Southern Plains from 1800-1850,” The Journal o f  American H istory  78 (September 1991, 
No. 2), 465-485.
29 For a detailed examination o f this phenomenon see Richmond Clow’s, “Bison Ecology, Brule and Yankton 
Winter Hunting, and the Starving Winter o f 1832-33,” Great Plains Q uarterly (Fall 1995, vol. 15), 259-270.
30 Douglas B. Bamforth, “Historical Documents and Bison Ecology on the Great Plains,” Plains 
Anthropologist: Journal o f  the Plains Anthropological Society, (February 1987, Vol. 32, Number 115), 1-16.
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cultural adjustment. Despite the Treaty of Fort Laramie’s declaration of hunting rights in 
1868, the tribe hunted buffalo only with permission of the resident Indian agent. Indians 
that hunted without the agent’s authorization risked being labeled hostile and then 
subjected to punishment. Consequently, buffalo hunts occurred less frequently and 
became far less successful following the creation of the Great Sioux Reservation. In the 
only account of a successful Oglala buffalo hunt beyond 1868, Indian Agent J. W. Wham 
reported issuing two months worth of ammunition for a hunt on the Republican River in 
mid-September 1871. The Indians requested that no whites accompany them on that hunt, 
yet sub-agent Yates went along despite their objections. The same report noted that the 
Oglala killed large numbers of buffalo on that particular hunt.31
The primary reason that buffalo hunts happened with less regularity is that 
authorization from Indian agents and subsequent support from the federal bureaucracy 
remained unpredictable. In the fall of the next year the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, F. 
A. Walker, notified J. W. Daniels, the Red Cloud Agent, that Little Wound had organized 
a hunting party for a second time without permission. The Commissioner stated that the 
War Department had been notified and instructed to bring him and his party back to the 
agency.32 These economic impediments, such as decreased buffalo herds and increased 
government interference, greatly discouraged the organization of hunting parties following 
1868.
As hunting became more restricted and unsuccessful the tribe depended more and 
more upon the United States for sustenance. Agent Daniels wrote to the Commissioner in
31 Executive Documents, House o f Representatives, Report o f  the Commissioner o f  Indian Affairs, 42nd Cong., 
2nd sess., 1871-1872, Serial No. 1505, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1872), 1118-1119.
32 Commissioner o f Indian Affairs F. A. Walker to Agent J. W. Daniels, November 5, 1872, General Records: 
Correspondence received from the Office o f  Indian Affairs, Indian warehouses & special agents, chronological 
arrangement, Feb. 24 ,1871  -Dec. 31 ,1877 , Box 2, RG 75, KC.
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his yearly report of 1873 that the hostile Chief Red Cloud and his followers
come to these agencies starving and enemies, and received the same kind care that 
was given to those who had been here for years when they first came in they sent 
their soldiers to get rations that they might taste white man’s food without his 
knowing of it, but after a few issues they came to acknowledge their 
dependency.”'''’
In his 1874 report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs newly appointed Indian Agent J. 
J. Saviile related how he instructed an independent feeling Oglala who had caused trouble 
“to the fact that the buffalo were almost all destroyed, and as soon as they were gone the 
Indians would be helpless.”34 Clearly, Oglala leaders no longer maintained the ability to 
provide needed food and shelter for their followers. This development undoubtedly led to 
a breakdown in kinship relations and aspects of societal reciprocity. Economic realities 
began to dominate tribal decision-making and social structures.
The federal government’s actions of restricting the tribe’s movements and hunting 
practices also hoped to prevent conflicts between the Lakota and other tribes in the 
region, and the ever increasing population of whites moving into the region. On May 16th, 
1874 Little Wound’s band again failed to receive permission to hunt on the Republican 
river from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, despite their 1868 treaty rights, because of 
the Oglalas’ cruel and unjust treatment of the Pawnee the previous year. The 
Commissioner referred to the Oglalas’ ambush and defeat of a Pawnee hunting camp on 
the south shore of the Platte River in the summer of 1873, which the Oglala considered 
their hunting territory. In the ensuing battle over a thousand Lakota warriors killed almost 
two hundred Pawnees.35
3j Executive Documents, House o f Representatives, Report o f  the Com m issioner o f  Indian Affairs, 43rd Cong., 
1st sess., 1873-1874, Serial No. 1601, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1874), 612.
34 Executive Documents, House o f  Representatives, R eport o f  the Com m issioner o f  Indian Affairs, 43rd Cong., 
2nd sess., 1874-1875, Serial No. 1639, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1875), 560.
35 Royal B. Hassrick. The Sioux: Life and Customs o f  a W arrior Society (Norman: University o f  Oklahoma 
Press, 1964), 78.
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Two days later Agent Saville received another letter from the Commissioner 
stating that in spite of the tribe’s legal right to make the hunt no passes or permits would 
be issued because the hunt would, “terrify the settlers and get the Indians into trouble” 6̂ 
However, the still somewhat autonomous Oglala organized and conducted an extended 
buffalo hunt that fall near the Republican River in spite of federal opposition.
Unfortunately the several thousand Indians managed to procure only one hundred buffalo 
and an unspecified number of cattle that fall. That winter was extremely severe, and 
snowstorms in January and February blocked supply trains and prevented the beef 
contractor from supplying the Red Cloud Agency. Many Indians went hungry and those 
nearer the agencies begged for whatever food was available. In the spring the tribe 
returned to the Red Cloud Agency, “with the sad realization that they had been on their 
last buffalo hunt.”37
The Oglala Lakota’s life as a nomadic hunting group that lived and depended upon 
the great herds of buffalo had ended. In 1876 the Oglala gave up the western third of their 
reservation, which included the Black Hills, and their hunting rights in exchange for 
federal assurance that they would not be removed to Indian Territory in Oklahoma. This 
agreement of 1876 stated that the, “Indians do hereby relinquish and cede to the United 
States all the territory lying outside the said reservation, ... including all privileges of 
hunting.” The tribe undoubtedly continued to kill buffalo when the opportunity presented 
itself but the federal government no longer allowed the Lakota freedom or means to
36 Commissioner E. P. Smith to Agent J. J. Saville, May 16 and 18, 1874, General Records, Correspondence 
received from the Office o f  Indian Affairs, Indian warehouses & special agents, chronological arrangement, 
Feb. 24, 1871 -Dec. 31, 1877, Box 2, RG 75, KC.
3' George E. Hyde, R ed  C lo u d ’s Folk: A H istory o f  the O glala Sioux Indians (Norman: University of  
Oklahoma Press, 1937), 229.
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pursue the ever-dwindling herds of bison.38
An example of the tribe’s economic desperation was revealed in 1879, and again 
ini 881. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs denied Young-Man-Affaid-of-His-Horses 
permission to hunt the Yellowstone and Upper Missouri rivers because of the possibility 
of conflict with settlers.'9 This denial occurred because the Oglala sometimes targeted 
surrounding ranches during their intermittent hunting forays. The tribal hunters allegedly 
killed some of the neighboring ranchers’ cattle, stole horses, and forced herders to 
surrender food and ammunition. The Wyoming Stock Growers Association complained to 
Governor Hale of Wyoming concerning this matter in 1883. The Association noted all of 
the above infractions and added that the Indians offered up their women for prostitution in 
exchange for food. The WSGA also noted that most of the offending hunters possessed 
passes issued by the local Indian Agent.40 The white members of the WSGA undoubtedly 
exaggerated greatly in regards to these alleged charges in order to gain federal support in 
limiting Indian access to what the ranchers considered their grazing lands.
However, the fact that some of the tribe’s hunts targeted cattle indicates that the 
Oglala could not find, or lacked access to, the remnant herds of bison that disappeared 
from the Great Plains by 1885. It further demonstrates that the tribe was sufficiently 
hungry to risk hostilities by taking white men’s stock, and their own fledgling tribal herd 
remained insufficient in size to provide for their needs. The tribe’s association with the 
buffalo was all but dead, and cattle would soon replace the great shaggy beasts of the
38 The Statutes at Large o f  the United States o f  America, from  December, 1875, to M arch 1877, and Recent 
Treaties, Postal Conventions, and Executive Proclamations, Vol. XIX (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1877), 255. The federal representatives ignored Article XII of the 1868 Treaty o f Fort Laramie by not 
obtaining three fourths o f adult male signatures for its ratification.
39 Letter received by Agent V. T. McGillycuddy from Commissioner Hayt on October 25, 1879, General 
Records, Box 3, Jan. 1, 1878-Dec. 26, 1879, RG 75, KC, and Letter received by Agent McGillycuddy from 
Commissioner H. Price on Oct. 20, 1881, General Records, B o x 5 , April 26, 1881-June6, 1882, R G 75,K C .
40 Letter received by Agent McGillycuddy from Commissioner Price, Nov. 13, 1883, General Records, Box 6, 
June 12, 1882-Dec. 1883, RG 75, KC.
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Plains not only as the tribe’s primary source of sustenance, but as the foundation of a new 
tribal economy.
24
CHAPTER TWO 
Cattle Offer Hope: The Oglalas’ Struggle for Autonomy
Cattle easily replaced the buffalo within the Northern Plains environment because
this region was, and remains, primarily suited for the care and raising of livestock in the
absence of native grazers and large predators. The climate, grasses, and soil combined to
create‘an environment that is particularly adapted for ungulates such as buffalo and cattle.
The predominant soils found within the 1868 reservation boundaries consisted of prairie
soils, lithosols and shallow soils, and a small amount of chernozem soils located only in the
extreme southeastern tip of the reservation. Lithosols and shallow soils consist of “an
imperfectly weathered mass of rock fragments, largely but not exclusively on steep
slopes,” which are more commonly referred to as either sandhills or badlands. Chernozem
soils are “dark-brown to nearly black soils of cool and temperate, subhumid grasslands.”
However, it is the prairie soils that consist of the "very dark brown soils of cool
and temperate, relatively humid grasslands,” that are home to the rich and nutritious short
grasses such as grama and buffalo grass that buffalo, elk, deer, antelope, and cattle thrive
upon.41 Bouteloua gracilis, or blue grama grass is a native perennial in the northern Great
Plains. It not only produces highly nutritious summer forage, it also provides excellent
winter pasture as it retains its protein content if allowed to cure while standing. Buchloe
dactyloides, or buffalo grass, is also an outstanding source of nourishment and forage for
herbivores of the Great Plains. Its
growth begins in late spring and continues all summer. The forage is attractive to 
all classes of livestock. Buffalograss becomes established rather easily, and 
spreads vigorously under use. It withstands prolonged heavy grazing better than 
any other native grass in its region of adaptation; on ranges severely grazed every
41 The information and quotes pertaining to soils was obtained from the chart titled GENERAL PATTERN OF 
GREAT SOIL GROUPS: THE WHEAT BELT in a text by Ladd Haystead and Gilbert C. Fite, The 
Agricultural Regions o f  the United States (Norman: University o f Oklahoma Press, 1955), 180-181.
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year, it often survives as a nearly pure stand.42 
When the soil conditions and flora are mixed with an annual yearly rainfall of under twenty 
inches per year it creates an environment conducive to the development of a regional 
cattle industry once the indigenous wild grazers and their predators are removed.4"'
With an understanding of the region’s productive capabilities it seems clear that 
stock raising provided the foundation needed to grant the tribe economic self-sufficiency 
within the encroaching market system. Some of the Red Cloud Agency’s Indian Agents 
clearly understood that the development of a cattle industry was crucial to the tribe’s 
economic independence, as did the Oglala Lakota themselves. In 1875 Agent J. J. Saville 
stated in his report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that, “the primary question of 
civilization is subsistence. This question presents peculiar difficulties in this country. If 
the Indians become self-supporting, it must be by the same pursuits that the white people 
engage in, viz, stock-raising.” From June 27th to 29th of the same year a council was held 
to discuss the tribe’s relinquishment of the Black Hills and all hunting rights in that area.
During the course of this meeting the tribe clearly demonstrated its understanding 
of the value of cattle in this region and the future benefits that could be derived from the 
establishment of a tribal herd. The United States offered the tribe $25,000 total for their 
hunting rights, and the Oglala said that if such a decision came to pass then they wanted 
the equivalent of the money to be paid in cattle, horses, and harnesses and wagons. Chief 
Spotted Tail stated, “I want to live on the interest of my money, (received for the loss of
42 W. A. Wheeler and D. D. Hill, Grassland Seeds: A H andbook o f  Information About the Grass and Legume 
Seeds U sedfor Forage, Pasture, Soil Conservation and Other Turf Planting in the United States (New York: 
D. Van Norstrand Company, Inc., 1957), 562, 579-580.
43 The average annual rainfall in South Dakota between 1882 and 1960 was 19.12 inches per year. This 
average included regions of Eastern South Dakota that were not part o f the Great Sioux Reservation and 
receive a higher average rainfall per year than the reservation. For the reservation created in 1868 the average 
rainfall was closer to 16 inches per year than 19, which demonstrates why the attempt to cultivate this region 
using diy farming methods failed. Herbert S. Schell, H istory o f  South Dakota, 11-12.
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the Black Hills) The amount must be so large that the interest will support us .. .1 will 
trade some of it for stock to raise cattle.. .we want some good cattle every year.” 
According to the “Final Proposition of Council IV” the Lakota were to receive from the 
United States government for the loss of the Black Hills, “$50,000 for ten years to be paid 
in good American cows and other livestock, and in such implements of husbandry as are 
convenient to stock-growing and as may be deemed advisable by the President.”44
However, the treaty failed to guarantee that the federal government would in good 
faith fulfill its obligations. On August 10th of that same summer in a meeting between the 
Lakota Chiefs and a committee investigating fraud at the Red Cloud Agency Chief Little 
Wound complained that, "the wagons had not come yet; the cattle and horses had been 
delivered, but the cattle were small and the horses were wild and could not be broken.” 
Clearly, either the Indian agent in the field or the suppliers did not intend for the Oglala to 
partake fully in the burgeoning regional cattle industry. Further insights into the troubles 
the tribe would face in its attempt to build an economy based upon ranching was provided 
by the Chairman of that committee, the former Governor of Missouri Thomas C. Fletcher, 
who opened that June meeting of 1875 by admonishing the Oglala to, “learn the white 
man’s way of agriculture and husbandry.”45
An examination of the experiences of the Northern Cheyenne at Tongue River 
Reservation in southeastern Montana demonstrated similarities concerning the economic 
evolutions that occurred in Oglala culture. First of all, the Northern Cheyenne were close
44 Executive Documents, House o f Representatives, Report o f  the Commissioner o f  Indian Affairs, 44th Cong., 
1st sess., 1875-1876, Serial No. 1680, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1876) Agent Saville’s 
comments pertaining to stock-raising are found on p.753. The Oglala’s council with the federal government’s 
representatives is found on pp. 690-693.
45 James C. Olson, R ed Cloud and the Sioux Problem  (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), 192- 
193.
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allies of the Lakota and often lived and fought beside them during the zenith of their 
regional power. In fact a contingent of 517 Northern Cheyenne resided on Pine Ridge 
Reservation as late as 1890.46 These two tribes shared considerable cultural 
characteristics. They both enjoyed the equestrian nomadic way of life that depended upon 
the buffalo for its economic continuation. Both tribes consisted of a loose confederation 
of extended family groups tied to one another by a shared language and history. And 
finally, they closely resembled each other in dress, mannerisms, and even adopted some 
words of the others language into their own vocabulary.
A striking example of this similarity occurred on May 28, 1877 in Darlington, 
Oklahoma. On that date a group of Northern Cheyenne arrived on the Southern Cheyenne 
reservation in Indian Territory after being removed from the Northern Plains. Upon 
arrival Little Rogue, a Southern Cheyenne, gestured at his Northern brethren and asked, 
“What are the ‘Sioux’ doing here?” The Southern Cheyenne failed to recognize their 
Northern brothers as part of their own culture, and they expressed no joy at this forced 
reunion. The two divisions of the Cheyenne continued to bicker at one another until the 
Northern Cheyenne, under the leadership of Dull Knife and Little Wolf, fled the Cheyenne- 
Arapaho Agency. Eventually, after much hard travel and privation, Dull Knife’s band 
found sanctuary with the Oglala at Pine Ridge. Their descendents made up the contingent 
of Northern Cheyenne the inhabited Pine Ridge for the next thirteen years.47 The 
Northern Cheyenne inhabiting Pine Ridge later joined other bands of their own tribe on the 
Tongue River Indian Reservation in southeastern Montana.
Moreover, for the sake of comparison to the Oglala at Pine Ridge the Northern
46 Executive Documents, House o f Representatives, R eport o f  the Com missioner o f  Indian Affairs, 51st 
Cong.,2nd sess., 1890-1891, Serial No. 2841, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1891), 50.
4/ Orlan J. Svingen, The Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation, 1877-1900  (Niwot, Colorado: University 
Press o f Colorado, 1993), 19.
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Cheyenne make an excellent subject. For example the Northern Cheyenne also faced 
problems from a white community hostile to their very presence at the Tongue River 
Indian Reservation. Surrounding cattle interests campaigned for the tribe’s removal to 
Indian Territory throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The cattlemen 
hoped to gain valuable grazing lands for their ever-growing herds and rid themselves of 
possible economic competition.48 The white man’s fear of economic competition, 
especially from a defeated and seemingly inferior foe, hindered both the Oglala and the 
Northern Cheyenne tribes’ ability to participate equally in the expanding capitalistic 
economic system of the United States.
Nonetheless, while the Tongue River Reservation contained only 460,000 acres by 
1900, an increase of 204,000 acres since 1884, and fewer than a thousand Northern 
Cheyenne, they too hoped to gain economic independence through a tribal cattle industry. 
By 1880 the Northern Cheyenne had branded their small herds and according to General 
Nelson Miles they took as much pride in their cattle as they did any of their other 
possessions.49 Unfortunately, the almost mystical, and certainly mythical, image of the 
independent yeoman farmer as the backbone of a democratic and free nation offered an 
unyielding blueprint for the assimilation of Native Americans into American society. And 
as with the Oglala, the Northern Cheyenne in Montana were encouraged to farm rather 
than raise cattle in the early 1880s.50
However, this was not the first indication for either tribe that the United States 
would favor farming over ranching on the arid and unpredictable Great Plains. The federal 
government had already stated in the 1865 Lakota Treaty that its policy towards the tribe,
48 Ibid., xxi, 30-36 ,81 .
49 Ibid., 29, 145.
50 Ibid, 31.
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as with the vast majority of tribes in the United States, would be the promotion of
cultivation over ranching. As previously noted, contemporary American ideals saw the
independent farmer as the model for American citizenship. Therefore, the goals of United
States’ policies designed to assimilate Native Americans into white society often forced
Indians to adopt the role of farmer despite the environmental realities.51
Federal actions to promote farming over stock raising took many forms. In this
treaty the United States stipulated that the Lakota must promise not to impede members
of the tribe from pursuing agricultural interests. Moreover, the federal government
promised twenty-five dollars per tribal member for those engaged in cultivation of the soil,
ten dollars more than for those Indians who pursued other interests. The treaty also
promised the Oglala that if one hundred lodges gathered in one area for agricultural
reasons then the U. S. must provide an agency for that group and employ a farmer for
their instruction.52 Further reports of Red Cloud Agency Indian Agents indicated that they
found it difficult to implement this policy. This dichotomy between federal and local
decision-making is clearly seen in the Red Cloud Agent’s report to the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs for 1870. He stated that
it will be understood that teaching the Indians the art of cultivating the soil is 
attended with many difficulties in this locality.. .on account of location of the 
lands allotted to them for agricultural purposes, which, owing to the frequency of 
droughts and visits of the grasshopper, make the failure to produce a crop nearly a 
certainty.”53
Despite the agent’s on-cite experience and recommendations the federal policy of 
assimilation maintained that in order for the Indians to develop successfully into proper
51 Sheehan, Seeds o f  Extinction, 7-12.
52 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report o f  the Com m issioner o f  Indian Affairs, 39th Cong., 
2nd sess., 1866-1867, Serial No. 1284, (Washington: Government Printing Office), 5.
53 Executive Documents, House o f Representatives, Report o f  the Com m issioner o f  Indian Affairs, 4 l sl Cong., 
3rd sess., 1870-1871, Serial 1449, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1871), 685.
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American citizens they must adopt farming as their primary way of life.
Not surprisingly, the Northern Cheyenne experienced a similar struggle between 
bureaucrats in Washington who promoted agricultural pursuits and a local agent who 
envisioned stock raising as the tribe’s best chance for economic independence. The 
temporary agent at Tongue River Indian Reservation, a Private George Yoakam, 
requested in 1882 that of the money earmarked for rations on the reservation forty percent 
go towards the purchase of cattle. He hoped that within ten years the tribe would be able 
to support itself through the cattle industry. Nonetheless, an Indian Inspector, M. R. Barr, 
instead recommended that the Commissioner of Indian Affairs appoint a permanent Indian 
Agent, one other than Private Yoakam, one who understood farming. Despite the 
military’s classification of the Northern Cheyenne as “prisoner of war,” authorities hoped 
to settle the tribe in the Tongue River valley in accordance with the Indian Homestead Act 
of 1875, which provided Indians benefits similar to the Homestead Act of 1862.54
However, the dichotomy between federal policy makers and local agents 
concerning the future tribal economy of the Oglala was not the only problem found within 
the infrastructure of the federal Indian bureaucracy. Indian agents in the field were often 
temporary and differed greatly in their opinions concerning tribal economic opportunities. 
This is evident from the agent’s reports of 1873 and 1874. In 1873 agent J. W. Daniels 
stated that despite Chief Red Cloud’s opposition he believed that the tribe would soon 
begin to push toward agriculture as a way of life.55 The very next year a new agent, J. J. 
Saville, stated that, “agriculture can not be depended upon as a means for support for 
these Indians. The valley of White River and adjacent hills produce a fine grass... (and)
54 Svingen, The Northern Cheyenne, 35-43.
55 Executive Documents, House o f Representatives, Report o f  the Com missioner o f  Indian Affairs, 43rd Cong., 
1st sess., 1873-1874, Serial No. 1601, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1874), 611.
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stock-raising must be the main pursuit in this country.”56 The situation was becoming 
polarized because the local environmental conditions influenced local Indian Agents to 
pursue stock raising as the principle means of Oglala self-sufficiency. Meanwhile the 
federal government’s rigid policy of Indian Americanization, which hoped to create good 
United States citizens by turning tribal members into Jeffersonian yeoman farmers, ignored 
the environmental realities.
For the federal government, the beef ration was merely a stopgap measure to 
provide the tribe with enough nourishment until the Oglala could learn to support 
themselves as individual family farmers. Therefore, few attempts were made to supply the 
Oglala with breeding stock to create their own herds. Instead the government issued 
steers in order to meet their treaty obligations to provide a beef supply for the tribe. 
However, the government’s supply of beef inevitably failed to meet its treaty obligations 
or the tribe’s needs. According to the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty the government agreed 
to provide each tribal member with one pound of beef and flour per day, or approximately 
thirty pounds of beef per month.57 In a nine-month period from September 30, 1867 to 
June 30, 1868 the federal government issued 145,551 pounds of beef to approximately 
6,000 Oglala, Brule, Northern Arapaho, and Northern Cheyenne around the Red Cloud 
Agency .58 This came out to about twenty-four pounds of beef for each tribal member for 
a nine-month period, or about .09 pounds per day. It should also be noted that the 
number of pounds issued to the tribe was counted in gross poundage, or what the cattle
56 Executive Documents, House o f Representatives, R eport o f  the Commissioner o f  Indian Affairs, 43rd Cong., 
2nd sess., 1874-1875, Serial No. 1639, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1875), 560.
5/ Statutes at Large, 1868 Treaty ofFort Laramie, 639.
58 Executive Documents, House o f Representatives, R eport o f  the Commissioner o f  Indian Affairs , 40th Cong., 
3rd sess., 1868-1869, Serial No. 1366, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1869), 709.
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weighed on the hoof. Once a steer is slaughtered and processed for consumption the 
actual poundage of edible beef is cut by an average of two-thirds. Further loss could 
occur because of shrinkage, and spoilage, which would reduce post-processed beef by 
another 10% to 50%. Moreover, cattle weighed upon arrival, but not slaughtered 
immediately often lost hundreds of pounds over the winter yet still appeared on the roles 
at full weight, and steers that died over the winter also counted as issued beef.59
The federal government also continued to provide far less beef than Indian agents 
requested. In 1875 Indian Agent J. J. Saville stated in his report that it would take
14,782,500 pounds of beef to feed the Oglala, and Northern Cheyenne around Red Cloud 
Agency because each steer shipped was producing only 300 net pounds of beef The 
government contracted for only nine million pounds. For a population of about six 
thousand Indians, nine million gross pounds of beef would provide anywhere from 250 to 
500 net pounds of beef per person for that year. The amount Saville asked for would have 
produced from 410 to 820 net pounds of beef per person. The Treaty of 1877 increased 
the beef ration from one, to one and a half pounds of beef per day. Unfortunately, the 
government continued to use gross poundage delivered as the measuring system towards 
meeting its responsibilities, and thus fell far short of its treaty obligations.
In order for the federal government to comply with the Treaty of 1877, each 
member of the tribe should have been issued an average of 548 pounds of beef per year.
In an examination of the beef rations during the seven-year period from 1879 to 1885,1 
have calculated the average ration per person at between 175 to 350 net pounds of beef 
per year (Table No. 1). The higher figure assumed no spoilage, shrinkage, or loss of any
59 Paul M. Robertson, "The Power o f the Land,” 82-85.
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Table No. 1-Federal Beef Rations to the Oglala Lakota between 1879-1885.
YEAR TRIBAL
POPULATION
GROSS 
POUNDS OF 
BEEF ISSUED
NET POUNDS 
OF BEEF 
AVAILABLE 
PER YEAR
NET POUNDS 
OF BEEF PER 
PERSON FOR 
EACH YEAR
1879 7,000 7,522,807 2,482,526 178-355
1880 7,200 7,988,712 2,636,275 183-366
1881 7,500 8,753,332 2,888,599 193-385
1882 7,500 7,430,282 2,451,993 163-327
1883 7,800 8,280,262 2,732,487 175-350
1884 8,300 8,055,075 2,658,175 160-320
1885 7,649 7,941,438 2,620,675 172-343
AVERAGE 7,564 7,916,028 2,638,676 175-350
Note that the net poundage for eac i year was probably somewhat lower than presented because all
calculations were based upon the weight o f the cattle when they arrived at the agency. I was unable to take into 
account the losses caused by winter forage difficulties and deaths. The population figures are compiled from 
Indian Agents’ Reports to the Commissioner o f  Indian Affairs. The information provided concerning the 
pounds o f  beef issued was compiled from an agency record book entitled, W eigher’s Returns o f  B eef Cattle, 
M arch 29, 1879-June 1886, Administrative Records, Box 754, RG 75, KC. This ledger also contains the 
dates received, the numbers o f steers received for each date, the total weight received for each date, and the 
names o f the sellers who delivered the cattle to the agency.
kind after processing, while the lower figure allows for a 50% rate of loss. As the last 
column in the table indicates the beef rations for this period failed to meet the individual 
548-pound yearly requirement by at least 200 pounds a year. Not surprisingly, during this
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same period the Oglala started its own herd in order to provide for their own needs.60
By 1879 the Oglala as a tribe owned 1,622 head of stock' cattle. Agent V. T. 
McGillycuddy predicted that stock-raising should be excellent, as the Department of the 
Interior had issued 500 cows and heifers and 22 bulls, all of which possessed at least 1/4 
blood American stock (which meant non Texas long horns, which were indigenous to 
Spain). American stock, such as Herefords, offered more meat because of their stockier 
builds. Texas long horns, while hardy animals, were rather lean. These additional cattle 
brought the total herd number up to 2,500 by the end of the year. McGillycuddy found 
that the stock had been well cared for, despite predictions that the cattle would all be 
slaughtered and eaten, and that the tribe had managed to save 100 cows from the summer 
beef issue to bolster the herd. He stated that, “Indians have almost invariably herded their 
cattle well, and have raised young stock in considerable numbers.” Unfortunately, the 
report also identified two problems that would continue to haunt the Oglala throughout 
the nineteenth century and beyond.
The first pertained to the emerging domination of the tribal cattle industry by 
“squaw men.” These “squaw men,” white men who married Lakota women, sought to 
obtain the rights and advantages meant to provide Indians with an equal economic footing 
within the surrounding white communities. These white men and their mixed blood 
descendants continued to dominate the ranching industry on the reservation for 
generations for two reasons. First, they understood and could manipulate the market 
system of the whites more efficiently than the Oglala. A market system designed to 
reward those who attained personal goods and property. In Lakota culture if a man
60 These numbers were compiled from an agency record book entitled, W eigher's Returns o f  B eef Cattle, 
M arch 29, 1879-June 26, 1886, Administrative Records, Box 754, RG 75, KC. This ledger also contains the 
dates received, the numbers of steers received for each date, the total weight received for each date, and the 
names of the sellers who delivered the cattle to the agency.
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desired to accumulate personal wealth for its own sake it represented not only bad
manners, it demonstrated character flaws, such as selfishness. Such flaws meant he would
never hold a leadership position or gain the respect of his family or band because he placed
his own needs over that of the tribe’s. Such conflicting worldviews clearly placed the
Oglala at an economic disadvantage when in direct competition with “squaw men.” And
secondly, “squaw men” could make business decisions without asking permission from an
Indian Agent And within the capitalist system the ability to make timely and independent
business decisions is not only beneficial it is necessary in order to compete.
The second difficulty brought to light involved the illegal trespass of outside cattle
interests on reservation land. Agent McGillycuddy provided an example of both
difficulties when he noted that
the squaw-men assume that by marriage they have all the rights of full-blooded 
Indians, and they endeavor to exercise these rights not only in possession of cattle 
themselves, but also in ranging and pasturing upon Indian reservations large herds 
belonging to other white men; and when the removal of such cattle is attempted by 
the agent, the squaw-men claim property in them under fictitious bills of sale.61
This practice of trespassing on tribal lands for free pasturage became so blatant that by 
1884 between 700,000 and 800,000 head of cattle illegally grazed on the Lakota 
reservation.62 Clearly, the Oglala stockmen faced difficult economic handicaps in their 
struggle to compete in an intrusive market economy. Federal Indian policy dictated on 
one hand that the Oglala alter their entire culture by adopting the precepts of capitalism, 
such as private property, individual avarice, and the accumulation of material goods.
While on the other hand the surrounding white cattle industry, and the “squaw men” on 
The Great Sioux Indian Reservation, attempted to exclude the tribe from full participation
61 Executive Documents, House o f Representatives, Report o f  the Com missioner o f  Indian Affairs, 46th Cong., 
2nd sess., 1879-1880, Serial No. 1910, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880), 75, 104, 145, and 
355.
62 Schell, H istory o f  South D akota , 243-247.
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in the market economy.
For the Northern Cheyenne the problem of cattle trespass assumed a more 
malevolent character. In southeastern Montana the white cattlemen who allowed their 
stock to graze illegally on the Tongue River Indian Reservation hoped that a conflict 
between the Indians and whites, brought about by cattle trespass, might bring about the 
removal of the tribe to Indian Territory. Moreover, white cattlemen charged that the 
Cheyenne burned their ranges, and frequently killed their cattle. While these charges 
proved false and the ranchers’ efforts eventually failed, the constant attack upon the tribe’s 
right to remain on the reservation negatively impacted its economic growth. The federal 
government hesitated to approve allocations for rations or cattle for the Northern 
Cheyenne on the chance that the charges proved factual. Financial support for the tribe 
was delayed for years as government inspectors and Special Agents arrived on site to 
determine the validity of the accusations.6̂
For the Oglala Lakota the problem of cattle trespass remained centered on 
economic competition rather than possible relocation. Despite these significant obstacles 
the tribe managed to increase its herds. In agent McGillycuddy’s report to the 
Commissioner in 1880 he noted that the number of cattle owned by tribal members rose to
3,500 because of a summer issue of 1,000 head of stock cattle. It should also be noted 
that it is unclear as to what percentage of the herd fell under “squaw man” ownership and 
what percentage belonged to full blood tribal herd. Agent McGillycuddy provided only 
total reservation herd size in his reports. He also noted in June of 1880 that the tribe’s 
care of the stock cattle issued was quite good and, “in fact, these Indians taking naturally, 
as they do, to stock raising and herding, this would seem to offer the most feasible and
63 Svingen, The Northern Cheyenne, xxi, 30-36.
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practical method of making them eventually self-supporting.” McGillycuddy found the 
idea of a sustainable agricultural system for the Oglala unrealistic.64
However, the most fascinating aspect of the report lies in McGillycuddy’s theory 
about why Chiefs Red Cloud and Spotted Tail resisted any tribal acceptance of agriculture 
or herding. He correctly believes that these chiefs feared a loss of power and influence 
within the tribal political organization.65 Because of the tribe’s concentration around the 
agency the political structure of the Oglala became much more centralized, which gave 
leaders such as Red Cloud and Spotted Tail more power than tribal chiefs previously held. 
Before 1880 the Oglala political structure centered on multiband councils made up of 
chiefs from the tiospaye, or extended family bands, that strove to gain a group consensus 
before undertaking any significant political decisions. These decisions included 
discussions on whether or not to send diplomatic forays to surrounding tribes or whites, or 
a large war party to attack an enemy tribe. The important point to note is that individual 
chiefs possessed no dictatorial powers, and that they only influenced the council through 
their reputation as a leader and oratory ability. The council continued to debate such 
issues until a consensus was reached.66
However, by 1880 the Oglala chiefs such as Red Cloud and Spotted Tail garnered 
far more influence within the tribe. This occurred both because of consolidation of the 
tribal population around Pine Ridge Agency, and the tribe’s societal crisis. The Oglala 
political framework allowed for fluidity of decision-making based upon necessity. For 
example, as the tribe moved from one location to another it was vulnerable, so the
64 Executive Documents, House o f Representatives, R eport o f  the Com missioner o f  Indian Affairs, 46th Cong., 
3rd sess., 1880-1881, Serial 1959, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1881), 162.
65 Executive Documents, House o f  Representatives, Report o f  the Com missioner o f  Indian Affairs, 46th Cong., 
3rd sess., 1880-1881, Serial No. 1959, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1881), 162-163,382-383.
66 Catherine Price. The O glala People, 1841-18 79 (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1996), 2-6, 
172,173.
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wakiconza (camp administrator) briefly held great decision-making power in the tribe.
And in times of military crisis, such as the defeat to the white soldiers in the late 1870s, 
the blotahunka (war party leaders) gained in political influence. As a result, the military 
defeat of the tribe in the late 1870s brought about a crisis that allowed chiefs to exercise 
more political influence. Therefore, the result is especially paradoxical when one 
considers that from the early 1840s the United States government’s main political 
objective in regards to the Oglala centered on the reduction of the chiefs influence within 
the tribe. The United States government hoped to more easily control tribal decision 
making by modifying the political structure of the Oglala.67 However, as the tribe 
consolidated around the Agency tribal members looked increasingly to their chiefs for 
guidance in how to interact with the whites.
Yet as the tribe began to spread out on the reservation in order to practice farming 
and ranching the chiefs lost much of their influence over the majority of tribal members. 
What is most interesting is the fact that as tribal members scattered throughout the river 
valleys to raise crops and livestock they began to readopt the traditional political structure 
of the tiospaye. The tribe became more decentralized as small family units started to make 
decisions concerning their lives without the chief s input. While the political and social 
organization of the tribe more closely resembled its earlier structure, the same could not 
be said for its economic delineation.
While tribal members scattered over the reservation in order to farm small plots or 
raise a few head of cattle they found themselves increasingly alienated from their economic 
beliefs in kinship relationships and reciprocity, which previously informed their economic 
practices. For a Lakota warrior the appearance of generosity equaled that of his bravery
67 Ibid, 172.
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in the eyes of the community. Generosity most often revealed itself in the social custom of 
the giveaway. A giveaway bolstered a warrior’s position within the tribe because it 
allowed him to reaffirm his kinship relationships and acknowledge his debts to others by 
giving away his possessions. The more a man gave away, the higher his status within 
tribal society.
Thus, as previously noted, a warrior’s ability to provide for his extended family 
outweighed his ability to accumulate personal possessions. Often warriors would give 
away their entire horse herds and many fine garments produced by their female relatives. 
Moreover, the ability of a man to give away such garments revealed the esteem with which 
his female relatives held him, for they would not create such beautiful clothing for a man 
who failed to provide for their every need. In fact the women’s creation of such garments 
did more than enhance her status and that of her provider, it helped maintain the vitality of 
kinship relationships within tribal society. However, during the 1870s and 1880s as the 
male members of the tribe lost access to many means of obtaining social status, such as 
warfare and raiding, they increasingly felt emasculated. What is most fascinating is that as 
the social and economic structures of kinship relationships and reciprocity fell into disuse 
during the 1880s, the women of the tribe greatly increased their production of fine 
garments in a failed attempt to maintain these methods of economic redistribution.68
As one might imagine, the idea of a giveaway ran counter to good old-fashioned 
American capitalism and this practice fell quickly out of favor with Indian agents 
determined to instill this new economic belief. Consequently, giveaways occurred more 
infrequently, which further degraded the role of kinship relationships and reciprocity 
within Oglala society.
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By 1883 approximately 7,800 Oglala inhabited the region around Pine Ridge 
Agency on the Great Sioux Indian Reservation, most dispersed throughout the creek 
bottoms, some as far as forty miles from the agency. The number of cattle owned by tribal 
members had risen to 5,500, yet agent McGillycuddy was concerned about the continued 
issue of beef rations. He felt that although most cattle owners on the reservation provided 
good care for their stock, many neglected their cattle or simply ate them because they 
believed that the United States would simply provide more.69 It should be noted that the 
“cattle owners” mentioned above probably referred to “squaw men” and their families, 
who more efficiently entered the regional cattle market.
The next year McGillycuddy’s report to the Commissioner noted that farming 
efforts increased in the river valleys, and he hoped for a “more systematic and enlarged 
effort.” He planned to divide the reservation into four farming districts with an agency 
farmer for each area. The four farming districts created: White Clay Creek, Wounded 
Knee, Porcupine Creek, and Medicine Root Creek districts, seemed to McGillycuddy 
capable of supporting a population of about 2,000. However, McGillycuddy did not 
understand that the Oglalas’ method of river valley farming offered the only feasible way 
to cultivate crops in this arid and unyielding region. Without access to irrigation “more 
systematic and enlarged efforts” of farming were doomed to failure. The irregular weather 
patterns of the Northern Great Plains provided occasional years of abundant rain and 
crops, but eventually the yearly rainfall dropped below twenty inches a year. This 
unpredictable pattern of rainfall prevented the effective establishment of long-term dry
68 Marsha Clift Bol, “Lakota Women’s Artistic Strategies in Support o f  the Social System,” American Indian 
Culture and Research Journal 9 (1985, No. 1), 33-51.
69 Executive Documents, House o f Representatives, R eport o f  the Commissioner o f  Indian Affairs, 48th Cong., 
1st sess., 1883-1884, Serial No. 2191, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1884), 92-93, 346-347.
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farming in this region.70
Clearly, the ecosystem of the region surrounding Pine Ridge Agency was best 
suited for the development of a tribal economy founded upon the care and raising of 
cattle. The soils, grasses, and yearly rainfall all combined to create an environment 
appropriate for large herbivores such as cattle, and prohibitive to the industry of farming. 
This is evidenced not only by the natural world but also by the economic system 
established by the surrounding white communities. A system based on ranching. As the 
Oglala realized that the federal government cared little about meeting its’ treaty 
obligations concerning meat rations the tribe sought to begin its’ own cattle operation.
Yet as the tribe attempted to establish a reservation economy sustained by ranching, it met 
with resistance from whites both on and off the reservation. “Squaw men” competed with 
Indians for access to reservation lands and markets for their beef, while white ranchers 
who ringed the Pine Ridge Agency, and the entire Great Sioux Reservation for that 
matter, boldly trespassed their herds on reservation pastures. Despite these difficulties the 
Oglala had established an inchoate reservation economy by the early 1880s that hinged 
upon the success of their burgeoning tribal herds. Unfortunately, the tribe’s budding cattle 
industry would experience more set backs and interference in the following decade.
70 Executive Documents, House o f Representatives, Report o f  the Commissioner o f  Indian Affairs, 48th Cong., 
2nd sess., 1884-1885, Serial No. 2287, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1885), 81-82.
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CHAPTER THREE 
The End of a Culture: The Oglalas’ Shift to the Market Economy.
As the 1880s progressed the cattle industry emerged as the foundation of the 
emergent Oglala reservation economy. Agent McGillycuddy clearly illustrated this point 
when it 1884 he stated that stock-raising went as “well as could be expected, many of the 
better class of Indians now owning respectable sized herds, breaking in steers for work 
purposes, and occasionally selling the increase to neighboring settlers, when in the opinion 
of the agent the same is advisable.”71 Moreover, the Oglala began to cooperate and 
coordinate with ranchers in Nebraska and the Black Hills area in gathering and returning 
winter strays. This amicable interaction is noted as being a welcome change from the 
previous practice of stealing each others’ stock whenever possible. It also demonstrated 
both groups’ willingness to cooperate when the result was mutually beneficial. Despite 
this advantageous development, the stock owned by tribal members remained at 
approximately 5,500.72 Interestingly, McGillycuddy’s remarks above pertaining to a 
“better class of Indians,” and his intimation to his power over tribal decision-making, offer 
insights into the developing economic transformations within the tribe and his own 
unquestionable power on the reservation.
When he refers to a better class of Indian he is describing the fomentation of an 
economic division within the tribe itself. This division often, but not always, formed along 
the lines of mixed bloods and squaw men versus the full blood majority. The terms 
“mixed blood” and “full blood” began to denote more than a difference in blood quantum. 
The terms evolved into a denotation for education and economic opportunities. Mixed
71 Executive Documents, House o f Representatives, R eport o f  Com missioner o f  Indian Affairs, 48th Cong., 2nd 
sess., 1884-1885, Serial No. 2287, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1885), 81-82.
72 Ibid., 350-351.
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blood cattle owners invariably possessed larger herds than the full bloods despite being a
distinct minority. The statement, “when in the opinion of the agent the same is advisable,”
seems innocuous enough on the surface but is an example of the overwhelming power
wielded by reservation agents. The agent, not the individual Indians themselves, decided if
a particular tribal member could sell his excess stock for profit or sustenance. In a
biography of McGillycuddy’s life, his second wife noted that
at this time there was probably no more autocratic position under the United States 
government than that of an Indian agent at a remote agency. The governor of the 
territory had no jurisdiction over the Pine Ridge agent. Though the Sioux 
Reservation was in Dakota, it was not properly a part of it. Approximately fifteen 
hundred miles from Washington.. the Pine Ridge agent ruled four thousand square 
miles populated by eight thousand Indians.7j
This situation gave “squaw men” and surrounding white cattlemen a distinct advantage in 
the regional market place, as they possessed the freedom to make timely and independent 
economic decisions concerning their operations.
A letter received in 1886 by Agent McGillycuddy from the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, the Honorable H. Price, further evidenced the restrictive and unequal competitive 
environment that the Oglala cattlemen competed under. In reference to surplus cattle (or 
cattle numbers beyond a maximum sustainable breeding herd) raised by the Oglala, 
Commissioner Price instructed Agent McGillycuddy to put an end to the selling o f these 
cattle by the tribesmen. Price also stated to McGillycuddy that, “your Indian police should 
be on the alert to prevent the sale of these stock cattle, unless when the sale is made with 
your full knowledge and consent.” Commissioner Price went on to say that “if they 
(meaning the Oglala) persist in selling their cattle, unless with your consent and under your 
personal supervision, that they will be placed on the list of Indians not deserving any
73 Julia B. McGillycuddy, M cGillycuddy Agent (London: Humphrey Milford; Oxford University Press, 1941),
.5-6.
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further aid from the government in that direction.”74 The Commissioner, safely insulated 
from the economic realities of Pine Ridge Agency, believed that a larger tribal herd 
benefited the Oglala more than the ability to make their own economic decisions. The 
policy of preventing Indians from selling their surplus cattle in order to establish a larger 
herd might seem the work of a benevolent benefactor from the government. However, the 
purpose of any cattle operation is to sell off surplus cattle while maintaining a base herd 
for reproduction.
The prevention of the tribe from participating in the regional cattle market placed 
them under a severe economic handicap. Surrounding white cattle operations sold, 
slaughtered, moved, and cared for their herds as the local market economy dictated.
Tribal operations on the other hand remained under the strict control of the Pine Ridge 
Agency Indian Agents. These agents, and not the Indians themselves, shaped the 
burgeoning tribal cattle industry. In considering the disadvantages of the tribal herders 
one might also ask how they survived without the ability to obtain capital for needed 
expenses? This question did not greatly concern Commissioner Price, who had three years 
previously stated that, “these cattle are to be kept solely for stock purposes and must not 
be slaughtered nor issued to the Indians, as to the increase from said stock, that will be a 
matter for future consideration.”75 Clearly the three-year interval had provided no 
answers in regards to surplus cattle. Thus the Oglala seemed caught in a vise, with the 
federal government promoting unrealistic agricultural and economic practices on one side, 
and the autocratic Indian agent, whose decisions affected the direction and effectiveness of 
the developing reservation economy, on the other.
74 Letter received by Agent V. T. McGillycuddy from Commissioner Price on March 5, 1884, General Records, 
Box 7, Jan. 2, 1884-April 22, 1886, RG 75, KC.
'5 Letter received by Agent V.T. McGillycuddy from Commissioner Price on July 3, 1883, General Records, 
Box 6, June 12, 1882-Dec. 1883, RG 75, KC.
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In 1885, agent McGillycuddy’s final year on Pine Ridge, he requested that the 
Commissioner put an end to the issue of beef rations on the reservation. He believed that 
in order for the Oglala to become independent workers they needed to be forced to work 
for their food. Moreover, he believed that the beef issue was wasted upon the tribal dog 
population, estimated at between 30,000 and 40,000 dogs. McGillycuddy reported an 
increased interest in stock raising for the year, but the number of stock cattle decreased 
from the previous year’s total of 5,500 to 4,927. He also noted that while Red Cloud’s 
band killed and ate their issue of stock cattle, more industrious members of the tribe sold 
300 head of 3-4 year old steers for 39,000. Again, this is probably an example of the 
economic divisions that appeared during this period between Red Cloud’s “full bloods” 
and “squaw men” and their mixed blood descendents. Moreover, McGillycuddy proudly 
noted that farming output quadrupled, and he credited his four agency farmers for the 
increase. Yet according to his report only 1,788 acres had been tilled, which was 22 acres 
less than reported in 1880!76
As the 1880s progressed the reservation farming enterprises developed by Indian 
Agents fell on hard times. Oglala efforts at farming under the direction of agent H. D. 
Gallagher faired poorly in 1887, with only 1,801 acres under cultivation. Although 
Gallagher noted that Red Cloud’s people, “are certainly beginning to understand the 
importance of making some effort in the direction of farming,” he also reported that 
drought killed almost every crop on the reservation.77 The tribe worked diligently in an 
effort to make the farming programs succeed. They understood the benefits of farming; 
they had practiced river valley farming for decades before contact with whites. Yet the
76 Executive Documents, House o f Representatives, Report o f  the Commissioner o f  Indian Affairs, 49th Cong., 
1st sess., 1885-1886, Serial No. 2379, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1886), 261-264, 596-597.
7/ Executive Documents, House o f Representatives, R eport o f  the Commissioner o f  Indian Affairs, 50th Cong., 
Ist sess., 1887-1888, Serial No. 2542, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889), 123-124.
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tribe’s method of agriculture involved the simple technique of planting scattered, and 
unsystematic, fields of crops near riverbeds to take advantage of the nearby water source.
The Oglala picked up these techniques from more agrarian neighbors such as the Arikara 
and Pawnee.
For the invading whites this method was unacceptable. They demanded well laid 
out fields of crops all in neat rows, and they demanded that the men do the farming.
While this model succeeded in areas of sufficient rain, and was successfully adopted by 
eastern tribes such as the Creek and Cherokee, it failed to account for plagues of 
grasshoppers and a scarcity of rainfall. Again, the harsh environmental realities o f the 
region shattered the hopes of well-intentioned bureaucrats who held fast to their belief that 
dry-farming on the reservation offered the tribal members their best chance at economic 
independence.
The drought, and the severe blizzards that followed during the winter of 1886- 
1887, proved to be disastrous for the free-range cattle industry in this region. Free range 
ranching, which developed regionally in 1880, allowed cattle herds to roam freely during 
the winter in search of fodder and shelter in the protected river valleys and creeks. 
Normally, surrounding cattle outfits gathered anywhere from 10,000 to 75,000 head each 
spring. However, they rounded up only 3,000 head of cattle during the spring roundup of 
1887. This roundup consisted of 23 wagons, 2,500 head of horses, and 325 men 
representing about fifty outfits in the area. During the boom years between 1880 and 
1886 the region was massively overgrazed as each operator strove to maximize herd size 
and increase profits.
This practice of overgrazing, coupled with a dry summer and a severe winter, left 
as many as % of the area’s outfits, “to the wall with a seventy-five to hundred percent
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‘kill’ of their range stock.”78 The grass had failed to replenish itself because of the lack of 
rainfall, and the deep snows prevented cattle from finding the little forage that remained. 
Remarkably, the Oglala stock cattle fared very well in comparison because of the 
reservation practice of providing the herds with winter fodder. At the time of agent 
Gallagher’s report to the Commissioner in 1887, the number of tribally owned stock cattle 
stood at 6,278 head, up from 4,927 in 1885 despite the killing winter.79 Unfortunately, the 
next year saw a dramatic reversal of fortunes for both the tribal and white cattle interests.
In 1888 an event occurred that at the same time greatly decreased the prospects of 
the Oglala tribe’s cattle interests in the region and greatly increased the surrounding white 
cattlemen’s future economic security. The Sioux Bill of April 30, 1888, reduced the Great 
Sioux Reservation by 9,000,000 acres and scattered the separate tribes of the Lakota 
among various smaller reservations. Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, created for the Oglala 
and Northern Cheyenne, contained 3,155,200 acres. For the ceded land the entire Lakota 
nation received a twenty year extension of the educational provisions of the 1868 Treaty, 
thirty new day schools, farm equipment, $1,000,000 of excess money from ceded land 
sales, and 26,000 head of stock cows and 1,000 bulls.80 The Oglalas’ share of the stock 
came out to 7,520 cows and 300 bulls.81 The tribe’s request for such large numbers of 
cattle revealed their understanding of the industry’s importance to their future economic 
growth.
Not surprisingly, the cattle industry outside the reservation strongly supported, if
78 Bert L. Hall, Roundup Years, O ld  M uddy to Black Hills (Pierre: State Publishing Co., 1956), 276.
79 Executive Documents, House o f  Representatives, Report o f  the Com missioner o f  Indian Affairs, 50th Cong., 
1st sess., 1887-1888, Serial No. 2542, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889), 464-465.
80 Executive Documents, House o f  Representatives, Report o f  the Com missioner o f  Indian Affairs, 50th Cong., 
2nd sess., 1888-1889, Serial No. 2637, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889), LXXIII.
81 Letter received by Captain Penney from Commissioner D. Browning, March 13 ,1895 , General Records,
Box 17, RG 75, KC.
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not actually led, the agitation to reduce the Great Sioux Reservation. Because of the 
region’s aridity no great land rush occurred because farmers knew they could not survive 
in the region, which left the majority of land available for the nearby ranching interests.82 
The effects of this enormous land swap further polarized the ranching industry in the 
region. For the white ranchers in the region it meant vastly increased pasturage for their 
herds. For the Lakota it meant severe restrictions on herd size and increased pressure 
from the white cattle ranchers. For example, the agent reported that during the winter and 
spring white ranchers herded large numbers of cattle onto the reservation in order to 
obtain free grazing and avoid taxes. The agent wrote letters to all offending parties 
requesting that they remove their stock by July 1st, and most complied. However, some 
small operators ignored the agent’s requests.84
The farm equipment provided for the tribe in the Sioux Bill of 1888 underscored 
the government’s determination to create an Indian community of yeomen farmers.
Clearly, the symbol of the independent farmer as the foundation of the nation’s economy 
remained strong despite the industrial revolution in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. For most Americans land still represented economic freedom and the wellspring 
of democratic influence within the United States. Despite the determination of such well- 
meaning government officials, the tribe’s farming efforts failed in 1887 because of yet 
another drought that killed almost all crops raised on the reservation. However, 1888 saw 
an abundance of rain, and the tribe raised over 21,000 bushels of com, and 6,000 bushels 
of potatoes.84 Unfortunately, this temporary success only encouraged the environmentally 
unrealistic policy of dry farming on the Northern Plains, a mistake that led to ecological
Si Schell, H istory o f  South D akota , 247.
83 Executive Documents, House o f Representatives, Report o f  the Com missioner o f  Indian Affairs, 50th Cong., 
2nd sess., 1888-1889, Serial No. 2637, (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1889), LXXIII.
84 Ibid.
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disasters such as the Dust Bowl on the Oklahoma plains. Fortunately, nothing quite so 
disastrous occurred on Pine Ridge because much less ground was broken by the plow.
The year 1889 marked a significant turning point for the Oglala, Lakota in several 
ways. This year marked the beginning of a true reservation economy, brought about by a 
changing federal policy pertaining to the beef ration. For the period between 1885 and 
1888 the federal government reduced the approved annual beef rations from 8,000,000 
pounds85 to only 4,000,000 pounds.86 This reduction occurred in response to a sharp 
reduction in the tribal census. Agent McGillycuddy’s census in 1885 counted 7,649 
Indians on the reservation,87 while the following year a new agent, Captain J. M. Bell, 
undertook a far more rigorous census in the name of efficiency and cost-cutting and found 
only 4,873 Indian living on the reservation. Agent Bell stated that the Indians, 
“acknowledge, they had been drawing rations for all their ghosts.”88
This manipulative, yet clever, behavior on the part of the Oglala demonstrated that 
the tribal leaders were able to respond to the shortages in the beef ration by working the 
system for the people’s benefit. If the United States government shorted the Indians on its 
beef issue, why not then exaggerate the number of Oglala and Northern Cheyenne living 
near Pine Ridge Agency? The tactic worked for twenty years, and still the Indians went 
hungry more often than not.
The desire to cut governmental spending while increasing efficiency is a 
characteristic of the Progressive Era in American history. However, for the Oglala the
85 Executive Document, House o f Representatives, Report o f  the Commissioner o f  Indian Affairs, 49th Cong., 
1st sess., 1885-1886, Serial No. 2379, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1886), 262.
86 Executive Document, House o f Representatives, Report o f  the Com missioner o f  Indian Affairs, 50th Cong., 
2nd sess., 1888-1889, Serial No. 2637, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889), 470-471.
87 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report o f  the Com missioner o f  Indian Affairs, 49* Cong., 
1st sess., 1885-1886, Serial No. 2379, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1886), 259.
88 Executive Documents, House o f  Representatives, R eport o f  the Com missioner o f  Indian Affairs, 49th Cong., 
2nd sess., 1886-1887, Serial No. 2467, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1887), 294.
50
timing proved especially bad when one couples the droughts, blizzards, and impending 
reduction of the Great Sioux Reservation in the late 1880s with the new census. This 
population shift from 1885 to 1886 constituted a 35% drop in tribal population, a fact that 
agent Bell believed could save the government $50,000 a year in beef rations alone. Not 
surprisingly, the 1887 gross poundage awarded for the beef contracts was reduced from 
6,500,000 pounds to 4,500,000 pounds, a drop of 31%.
The reduction in beef rations meant an end to the Oglala tribe’s economic security 
blanket, which remained at four million gross pounds under contract until the twentieth 
century. The tribe realized that the United States would never honor its obligation to 
provide adequate supplies in a timely fashion. This realization, coupled with growing food 
shortages and crop failures, created far more tribal interest in the cattle industry. After a 
short period of adjustment that saw their herd size dwindle, the Oglala intensified their 
commitment to the care and expansion of their herds.
While the tribe increased its interest in the cattle business, the reduction in the beef 
rations hindered the tribe’s ability to enlarge its operation immediately despite the cattle 
provided by the 1888 treaty. In 1889 the number of tribally owned cattle stood at 10,968 
head89, but by 1891that number dropped to 7,982.90 This decrease occurred because the 
Oglala often slaughtered their stock animals in order to survive, such as in 1890 when the 
tribe was forced to eat 700,000 pounds of their own stock cattle to make it through the 
winter.91 Clearly, the sharp reduction in beef rations created a shortage of food for a large 
portion of the tribe, which adversely affected its own cattle industry. However, by 1897
89 Executive Document, House o f  Representatives, Report o f  the Com missioner o f  Indian Affairs, 5 1st Cong., 
1st sess., 1889-1890, Serial No. 2725, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1890), 156.
90 Paul M. Robertson, “The Power o f the Land,” 56.
91 Executive Document, House o f  Representatives, R eport o f  the Com missioner o f  Indian Affairs, 51st Cong., 
2nd sess., 1890-1891, Serial No. 2841, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1891), 50.
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the number of Indian stock rose to 40,051 head, an increase of over five hundred percent 
in seven years.92 This expansion in the herd size demonstrates the productivity of the land 
when utilized for the care and raising of cattle.
Unfortunately, while this increase in cattle numbers helped some members of the 
tribe to achieve economic independence, the majority of the Oglala failed to reap the 
benefits from this growing industry. Squaw men, mixed bloods and a small number of 
enterprising full bloods continued to dominate the cattle industry on the reservation. 
Nonetheless, this renewed interest in raising cattle in order to gain economic self- 
sufficiency demonstrated that by 1889 the Oglala understood the importance of cattle to 
the regional economy and their own independence.
While cattle numbers on the reservation increased greatly, only a small percentage 
of the Indian population gained economic independence through this industry. “Squaw 
men,” which constituted only ten percent of the Lakota population on Pine Ridge in 1889, 
owned a disproportionate percentage of the cattle that legally grazed tribal lands.9. 
Moreover, events later revealed that many of the larger cattle interests on the reservation 
rejected the associations created by kinship relationships and reciprocity. For example, in 
1898 the “squaw men,” mixed bloods, and nearly all Indians who owned large numbers of 
cattle joined together to form a stock association to protect brands, kill wolves, and work 
together for each others’ mutual benefit.
The fact that they created a stock association and worked for their mutual benefit, 
and not the tribe’s, indicates that to some degree they accepted the American ideology of 
capitalism and its focus on obtaining wealth to a significant degree. Moreover, the
92 Executive Documents, House o f  Representatives, Report o f  the Com missioner o f  Indian Affairs, 55th Cong., 
2nd sess., 1897-1898, Serial No. 3641, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1897), 271.
93 Executive Document, House o f  Representatives, Report o f  the Commissioner o f  Indian Affairs, 5 1st Cong., 
1st sess., 1889-1890, Serial No. 2725, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1890), 152.
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concept of protecting individual brands demonstrates a strong belief in personal property 
and material accumulation, a belief not in tune with practices of kinship relationships and 
reciprocity, nor the generosity of the giveaway. That year the stock growers on Pine 
Ridge sold 2,000,000 pounds of beef to the United States to help the government meet its 
beef ration obligations to the rest of the tribe, and branded over 8,000 calves in the spring. 
The reservation agent was so optimistic about the future of the cattle industry that he 
predicted the yearly production of steers would soon double.
Yet during the same year he also noted that o f the 6,400 Indians living on the 
reservation, only twenty percent lived off their own labor, and the other eighty percent 
survived on government rations.94 This situation reveals that significant obstacles still 
prevented many of the tribal members from participating in the emerging reservation 
economy specifically, or the regional market economy in general. For example, larger and 
better-established white ranches out produced smaller reservation operation. They 
provided larger amounts of beef to market while at the same time possessing greater 
access to the markets because of the Indian Agent’s control over Oglala herds. Moreover, 
the cattle business requires an extensive investment in time and capital in order to compete 
successfully. Larger operations, both on and off the reservation, had greater ability to pay 
for shipping costs to distant markets and repair costs inherent with the business. Small 
Indian ranchers found it almost impossible to compete in the regional cattle market when 
faced with competition from “squaw men” and mixed bloods on the reservation and whites 
off, especially when the Agent’s interference was added to the equation. Unfortunately, 
more governmental “management” of Oglala cattle operations arose soon after the 
division and downsizing of the Great Sioux Reservation.
94 Executive Documents, House o f Representatives, Report o f  the Com missioner o f  Indian Affairs, 55th Cong. 
3rd sess., 1898-1899, Serial No. 3757, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898), 276 ,610 .
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A shift in governmental policy pertaining to managing and harvesting cattle also 
spotlighted the year 1889 as a significant date for the Oglala. As noted at the beginning of 
this paper, the preferred method of the Oglala for procuring and processing the issued beef 
was the traditional hunting method used to kill buffalo. The cattle were turned loose from 
corrals after being weighed and then systematically hunted down and shot from horseback. 
The fact that the Oglala clung to the traditional method for over twenty years 
demonstrates how cattle were used by the tribe as a tool for retaining as much of their 
tribal identity as possible. However, the local and federal officials never approved of this 
method of slaughter. As early as 1874 the Commissioner of Indian Affairs asked agent J.
J. Saville if a more efficient method could be found to dispatch the animals.95 Yet the 
practice of killing government issued beef from horseback continued for two decades. In 
June of 1889 a young man named Will S. Hughes gave this account of a beef issue at Pine 
Ridge
The boss farmer and his interpreter would enter the small house; at a command the 
cattle started thru the shute and the interpreter called the two names for each 
animal turned loose, until 500 long homed steers had been released. The big flat 
was covered with chasing, shooting Indians, until it sounded like a battle was 
taking place. After the firing had ceased Mr. Baredy took us out on the prairie 
where the slaughtering was being done. The first scene we witnessed was two 
squaws and two old men who were hurriedly ripping the hide from a big long hom. 
Four or 5 dusky children were eagerly watching the procedure. In fact it seemed 
that the 2 old ‘gals’ were doing the work. As the hide came off, meat was cut off 
in pieces, the papooses eagerly picking up clotted blood from under foot, eating it 
with apparent relish. The old bucks secured a kidney each, and would cut off huge 
bites and chew like a Virginia planter would a hunk of tobacco. The whole thing 
was (a) bit sickening to a tenderfoot.96
This scene, seemingly barbarous to the whites who witnessed it, demonstrated that the 
Oglala still believed that some semblance of their previous way of life was possible.
95 Letter received by Agent Saville from Commissioner E. P. Smith, April 9, 1874, General Records, Box 2, 
RG 75, KC.
96 Hall,Roundup Years, 172.
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However, in 1889 the policies pertaining to the handling and harvesting of tribal 
cattle changed. The government issued four new regulations regarding the slaughter of 
cattle: no cattle could be killed without the agent’s permission, no stock issued for 
breeding could be killed, cows or heifers could not be killed unless proven barren, and no 
permits would be issued to kill steers less than three years old. These rules served two 
practical purposes. The first regulation promoted the growth of the reservation cattle 
industry dominated by squaw men and mixed bloods. If the small herd owners were not 
allowed to butcher and eat their beef they had two choices, either attempt to compete with 
the larger outfits or sell their cattle to them. Either way the larger herd owners enjoyed 
the advantage. The second purpose aimed at putting an end to the seemingly barbaric 
practice of hunting cattle. Once the agent possessed the power to decide if cattle could be 
slaughtered at all, and when, he also held the power to decide the method. Not 
coincidentally, the practice of “hunting” cattle issued by the government lasted only 
another year.97
More importantly, new regulations concerning the handling of cattle stated that 
during the annual spring roundup, held in coordination with non-reservation cattle outfits, 
all calves must be branded with individual brands, not those of tribal bands.98 This 
branding policy further alienated the full bloods who had joined their small herds together 
in order to compete with larger cattle interests on the reservation. By forcing the bands to 
divide their cattle the government promoted the importance of the individual and the 
accumulation of personal property over that of the tribe as a whole. With these new 
regulations in place the Oglala Lakota on Pine Ridge faced the end of their socially driven
9/ Executive Documents, House o f Representatives, Report o f  the Commissioner o f  Indian Affairs, 51st Cong., 
1st sess.. 1889-1890, Serial No. 2725, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1890), 156.
98 Ibid.
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economic practices of kinship relationships and reciprocity as the foundation of their tribal 
economy.
Both socially and economically the Oglala had reached a significant turning point 
in the tribe’s history in 1889. The Sioux Bill o f 1888 cost the Lakota over nine million 
acres of productive land and created separate reservations for each band of the Lakota. 
The United States’ reduction of beef rations ended the Oglala complacency and sparked 
the beginning of a true reservation economy centered on the cattle industry. And most 
importantly, changes in federal policy regarding the care and handling of the tribally 
owned cattle made it increasingly difficult to maintain more familiar economic practices. 
These events made 1889 one of the most pivotal and culturally significant years in Oglala 
tribal history. The tribe still maintained its cultural identity; however, by attempting to 
both adapt to and adopt the ideals inherent in market capitalism the Oglala experienced an 
economic disaster that carried significant social and political implications for the Oglala as 
well.
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CONCLUSION
For the Oglala Lakota the twenty-one years between 1868 and 1889 marked the 
period that saw this once great tribe face the end of its culture. The tribe, which faced the 
near extermination of the buffalo, found themselves unable to stem the tide of American 
expansion. In a series of treaties with the United States government the Oglala lost 
increasingly larger segments of their territory. In exchange for this land the tribe hoped to 
provide for their future by gaining food rations, monetary compensation, schools, 
agricultural implements, and livestock. The Oglala believed that they might be able to 
maintain their cultural practices as they concomitantly adapted to an ever-encroaching 
society of white men. This aspiration proved an illusion.
The Oglala society, founded on the predominance of social obligations and kinship 
relationships, differed too greatly from that of the intruders from the United States. As 
the influence and infrastructure inherent in the capitalistic system of the United States 
spread across the Northern Great Plains the Oglala culture came under assault. Economic 
ideals based on reciprocity and social obligations for the good of the tribe fell victim to 
concepts of personal property and wealth for the benefit of the individual. Indian men, 
unable to provide for their extended families by hunting or raiding, abilities that had once 
lead to social status and tribal leadership, found themselves socially and economically 
emasculated. Most Oglala men, women, and children found themselves dependent upon 
government food rations for their survival.
In order to escape this dependency many tribal members sought to adopt white 
methods of economic survival. Many Indians, guided by extreme pressure from local 
Indian Agents acting on behalf of distant policy makers, tried their hands at farming and 
stock raising. The attempts at farming failed almost without exception as the 
environmental realities overpowered philanthropic ideals. Cattle, on the other hand,
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seemed to provide the best solution to economic dependence upon whites. However, 
tribal attempts at stock raising also failed despite the beneficial capabilities of the land.
For as the Oglala moved further into the capitalistic world of America, both at the 
direction of bureaucrats and on their own volition, they not only found that they could not 
compete on an equal footing with whites, they were deprived of the very foundations of 
their culture. The social ties of kinship relationships and reciprocity were damaged 
significantly during the economic transformation.
Many factors eventually contributed to the severing of many of the ties that bound 
the Oglala Lakota society together. The American government’s underlying theme of 
assimilation, influenced by Enlightenment thought and strongly informed by the emerging 
market economy, helped to shape a federal policy that strove to transform Indians into 
yeoman farmers. Only then could these barbaric heathens be incorporated into American 
white society. Moreover, the Indian agents, tools of the distant policy makers, 
implemented regulations that impeded the Oglala tribe’s attempts to maintain tribal 
identity while concomitantly instilling the values of the dominant culture, namely 
capitalism. However, while this policy brought about the end of Oglala society, the tribe’s 
subsequent attempts to participate in the regional market economy were impeded by 
competition from white cattle operations surrounding the reservation and the ascendancy 
of “squaw men” and their descendants on Pine Ridge itself.
During this brief twenty-year period the Oglala Lakota experienced a cultural 
reversal of massive proportions. In 1868 the tribe dominated the Northern Plains. The 
Treaty of Fort Laramie saw the United States government acquiesce to Lakota demands 
that closed the Bozeman Trail and assured the tribe complete sovereignty over the lands 
they claimed as their own. Lakota bands freely traveled across the prairies with their vast 
herds of horses in pursuit of buffalo. Two decades later the buffalo had disappeared, as
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did the Lakota way of life. Confinement replaced freedom, dependency replaced self- 
sufficiency, and the market economy replaced a system in which the economy remained 
subservient to social obligations. These social obligations of kinship relationships and 
reciprocity, practices that once drove the tribe’s economy, disappeared from most tribal 
economic practices as a result of the irresistible expansion of the United States and the 
market economy.
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